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Introduction 
 
The summer of 2001 was very reminiscent of the summer of 1938.  In the 
summer of 1938 the corporate accounting scandal of McKesson & Robbins 
rocked the nation causing Senate hearings and a detailed investigation. 1  The 
result of the 1938 firestorm was the creation of the first audit committees in the 
early 1940’s.  In the summer of 2001, the Enron scandal was a repeat 
performance.  The result of the 2001 scandal was the Sarbanes-Oxley 
legislation.  This paper will examine the regulator scheme of audit committees 
under Sarbanes-Oxley. 
First, this paper will look at the historical perspective on audit committees 
and examine what their initial purpose was and how this purpose developed prior 
to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.  Next, the audit committee portions of 
Sarbanes-Oxley will be examined in detail.  Out of this analysis, two main 
                                                 
1 SEC, Report on Investigation, McKesson & Robbins, Inc. (1940).  see also Acct. Ser. Rel. 19 (1940); 5 
SEC Ann. Rep. 110-111, 119-120 (1939); 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 176, 186-193 (1959). 
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questions arise:  1) Do we need regulation to ensure the independence of the 
audit function from management?  2) Can the Market determine the qualifications 
necessary to serve on the audit committee?  The conclusion of this paper is that 
regulation is needed to ensure the independence of the audit committee, but 
regulation is not needed to ensure the qualification of audit committee members. 
Historical Context 
 
In 1938, McKesson & Robbins had inflated assets and earnings by $19 
million through the reporting of nonexistent inventory and fictitious sales.2  In 
2003 dollars the $19 million would be over $250 million.3  The McKesson & 
Robbins Board’s response to the 1938 scandal was to claim that because they 
did not have independent control over the auditors, they did not have the tools to 
know or prevent what happened.4  In 1940 in response to the scandal, the SEC 
recommended all public companies create audit committees.  The SEC further 
recommended that outside directors should be on the board.5  Between 1940 
and 1978 many public companies created audit committees, but there was no 
actual independent control of the auditor by the audit committee.  The number of 
companies with audit committees gradually increased until in 1978 and 1989 the 
NYSE and NASD, respectively, required a company to have an audit committee 
in order to be listed, thereby forcing all publicly listed US companies to have audit 
committees. 
                                                 
2 Id. 
3 Inflation Calculator at the U.S. Department of Labor http://www.bls.gov/cpi 
4 SEC, Report on Investigation, McKesson & Robbins, Inc. (1940).  see also Acct. Ser. Rel. 19 (1940); 5 
SEC Ann. Rep. 110-111, 119-120 (1939); 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 176, 186-193 (1959). 
5 Id. 
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Case law has also impacted the development of audit committees.  For 
example, in 1996 the Delaware Supreme Court further defined general board 
duties in In re Caremark Int’l 6.  The Court held that board members had a duty to 
monitor the corporation.  While this opinion did not focus on audit committees, it 
did reinforce the role of the audit committee to monitor the corporation.  The audit 
committee does not need to act as if they are a second set of managers or so 
called shadow management.  Instead the board needs to monitor the corporation 
to attempt to prevent fraud or other bad faith manipulations of the corporation. 
In September 1998, Arthur Levitt, the Chairman of the SEC, gave a 
speech titled “The ‘Numbers Game’” in which he criticized ‘managed earnings’ 
and pointed to ‘accounting hocus pocus’ such as ‘big baths’ as a major concern 
in corporate America.7  This speech helped to focus attention on accounting in 
general and audit committees specifically. 
After Chairman Levitt’s speech, the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) was 
formed to examine corporate governance in general. 8  The BRC had members 
from many different backgrounds.  In 1999 the BRC came out with its 
recommendations.  The BRC recommendations included 1) defining an 
independent director as not receiving any additional compensation and not 
having worked for the company in previous 5 years, 2) creating a charter for each 
audit committee detailing what that audit committee does, and 3) making all 
                                                 
6 In re Caremark Int'l, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
7 Arthur Levitt, “The ‘Numbers Game,’” Remarks at New York University Center for Law and Business 
(Sept. 28, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt 
8 See generally National Association of Corporate Directors, Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Audit Committees (2000). 
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companies disclose their independent director and charter status.9  The BRC 
also recommended that if the company has greater than $200 million worth of 
assets than the audit committee should have at least three members, all of whom 
are independent and ‘financially literate’ or become ‘financially literate’ in a short 
period of time.10  ‘Financially literate’ is defined as basically able to read and 
understand financial statements.11  Lastly the BRC recommended that in a 
company with greater than $200 million worth of assets at least one member of 
the audit committee have accounting or related financial management 
expertise.12  In 1999 the NYSE and the other self-regulating organizations 
(SRO’s) adopted the BRC recommendations. 
In the summer of 2001, the Enron scandal broke resulting in the adoption 
of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  On April 1, 2003, the SEC required all 
SRO’s to follow the audit committee portions of Sarbanes-Oxley.  Both the NASD 
and NYSE have adopted rules consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley.  There are minor 
differences between the two rules, but they are consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley 
as well as each other. 
 The audit committee history up to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley 
fundamentally reinforced that all public companies should have an audit 
committee consisting of independent directors with independent control.  It was 
not until the 1999 BRC that ‘financial literacy’ and a financial management 
expertise was required. 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
 5 
Audit Committees Under Sarbanes-Oxley 
 
In light of this historical context, Sarbanes-Oxley continued the theme of 
establishing audit committee independence, control of the audit process, and 
also used concepts related to the recent ‘financial literacy’ requirement.  The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 states that the audit committee must 1) consist 
entirely of independent directors13, 2) have the auditor report directly to the audit 
committee14, 3) control the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the 
work of the auditor and any other public accounting company15, 4) pre-approve 
all audit and non-audit work done by the auditor16, 5) have control over the audit 
committee funding17, 6) be able to engage independent counsel and other 
advisers18, 7) disclose the ‘financial expert’ status of the audit committee19, and 
8) setup procedures for handling complaints regarding accounting, internal 
accounting controls and auditing matters20.  To implement this, the SEC 
promulgated a rule on April 1, 2003 that all SRO’s must require companies to 
adhere to Sarbanes-Oxley completely in order to be listed on the exchange.  By 
implementing Sarbanes-Oxley in this way, Congress has avoided attempting to 
create a new area of law. 
Sarbanes-Oxley requires that each member of the audit committee be 
independent.  ‘Independent’ is basically defined the same as previous regulations 
                                                 
13 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Sec 301(3) 
14 Id. at Sec 204 
15 Id. at Sec 301(2) 
16 Id. at Sec 202 
17 Id. at Sec 301(6) 
18 Id. at Sec 301(5) 
19 Id. at Sec 407 
20 Id. at Sec 301(4) 
 6 
as fundamentally not being affiliated with the company or any of its subsidiaries 
and not receiving any compensation in addition to board and committee pay.  
The independence of the audit committee members attempts to establish 
delineation between management and the audit function. 
A change to previous regulation is that the audit committee now has direct 
control over the auditor and audit functions.  This is achieved through sections 
202, 204, and 301(2) requiring that the auditor report directly to the audit 
committee and that the audit committee appoint, oversee, and compensate the 
auditor.  The last function given to the audit committee to ensure control over the 
auditor is that the audit committee must pre-approve any work to be done by the 
auditor and any other public accounting company.  Again, these changes are 
directed at audit committee independence and seem designed to reinforce the 
delineation between management and the audit function to ensure an unbiased 
approach. 
The next change is to give the audit committee complete control over its 
funding and allow it to consult outside counsel and other advisors.  Again, this 
change is attempting to separate the audit function from management.  The 
ability to consult outside counsel and to control its own funding seems to give the 
audit committee unlimited resources and potentially creates a shadow 
management.  The only limit on this function appears to be the shareholders 
ability to vote out over-spending audit committee members. 
While the above sections of Sarbanes-Oxley are attempts to reinforce the 
independence of the audit committee and the audit function, section 407 
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attempts to impart qualification requirements for the audit committee.  While 
section 407 does not require that all committee members be ‘financial experts’ it 
does require that the committee disclose at least one ‘financial expert’ or give a 
reason for not having a ‘financial expert’.  ‘Financial expert’ is defined as a 
person with an understanding of generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP) with experience in financial statements, internal audit controls, and audit 
committee functions.  This definition would seem to include virtually anyone 
within the senior management of any reasonable size company.  It also would 
seem to include anyone who managed a group that maintained its own budget 
that fed into financial statements of their company.  The definition allows for 
many people who do not have extensive experience, yet these people would be 
called a ‘financial expert’ to the investing public. 
Lastly, the audit committee has a new role as the primary repository for 
collecting and handling accounting complaints about the company.  This seems 
to go back to the independence concept because it implies distrust of 
management to handle the complaints properly or to forward relevant complaints 
to the audit committee. 
In all, Sarbanes-Oxley enhances the independence requirements 
dramatically and creates a new concept by requiring disclosure about audit 
committee member qualifications.  The question becomes is regulation 
necessary either 1) to ensure the independence of the audit committee or 2) to 
ensure that audit committee members are qualified.  This paper will argue that 
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regulation is needed to ensure the independence of the board, but is not needed 
to ensure the qualifications of the audit committee members. 
Commentator Criticisms of Sarbanes-Oxley 
 The two primary commentators that will be focused on are Prof. Ribstein 
and Prof. Elson.  Prof. Ribstein takes the fundamental view that rather than 
regulation to prevent future scandals, investors need to be more skeptical of the 
market and of disclosures.21  Prof. Elson takes the view that directors, particularly 
independent directors, do not devote sufficient time to board activities to 
adequately fulfill their duties and are beholden to management for their 
positions.22 
 Prof. Ribstien’s three main points regarding audit committees are: 1) the 
concept of independent directors is good, but they do not have sufficient time to 
contribute to the process, 2) the concept of having the audit committee control 
the audit process is good, but again the time constraints are a concern, and 3) 
regulation in general and particularly in this area creates a false sense of security 
for the investor.23 
Prof. Elson argues that corporate boards today are passive and in their 
most extreme form, simply rubber stamp managements decisions.24  Prof. Elson 
states that 1) the passivity of the board is shown by the very limited time that 
board members put into their positions, 2) the board is beholden to management 
                                                 
21 Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, 28 Iowa J. Corp. L. 1 (2002). 
22 Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board - The History of a 
Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. Rev. 127, 127-30 (1996). 
23 Ribstein 
24 Elson 
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(the so called ‘captured board syndrome’) because of the benefits received by 
board members, and 3) independent directors are chosen for their relationship 
with management, not what they can bring to the corporation.25  Prof. Elson goes 
on to argue that compensating board members is beneficial for focusing the 
board members attention.26  However, instead of giving benefits that are not 
related to the stock, even the outside directors should be compensated with 
stock to encourage them to be more involved and act like owners.27 
Prof. Ribstien’s position, as well as Prof. Elson’s position are used 
extensively in this analysis of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
Regulation is needed for Audit Committee Independence 
 
 The concept of audit independence has been understood since the 
McKesson & Robins scandal of 1938.  The board’s response to the scandal was 
to point to the fact that they did not have audit control so they did not know 
enough about the scandal to prevent it.  With the potential exception of the 
virtually unlimited funding provision, Sarbanes-Oxley articulates a strong set of 
regulations for maintaining audit committee independence.  Regulation is needed 
because 1) the cost of proper regulation is very low compared to the potential of 
preventing even one scandal, 2) the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley was 
done such that it did not usurp State Laws, 3) the nuances of independence have 
not been the sort of issue that the market focuses on, and 4) independence is an 
objective criteria that can be regulated.  Of course, this is a new regulation and 
                                                 
25 Id. at 127-30, 137-44, 157-59 
26 Id. at 157-59 
27 Id. 
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needs to be monitored to see if the benefit exceeds the cost.  The primary 
arguments against regulation in this area are: 1) structural bias may render 
attempts to force independence moot because the directors are beholden to 
management for their positions on the board, 2) even without the unlimited 
funding, the audit committee charged with the exclusive responsibility of 
managing the audit process may become shadow management, 3) the time 
constraints of most directors, especially independent directors means that 
potentially very little attention will be focused on the audit process, 4) the forced 
separation of the audit committee and management could decrease 
communication, and 5) the regulation could foster a false sense of security within 
the market.  Despite these valid arguments, it can also be argued that the low 
cost of maintaining an independent audit is very easily outweighed by even a 
single scandal prevented. 
Reasons for Regulation 
 The cost of regulating independence is low, especially if the unlimited 
funding requirement were repealed.  The cost of implementing this regulation 
falls into two categories, the cost of the SRO’s to monitor compliance and the 
cost of the companies to adhere to the regulation.  Monitoring is very inexpensive 
in this case, because it simply requires each company to disclose which directors 
are on the audit committee and what fees they receive.  Furthermore, most of 
this monitoring is already done to confirm that each company has an audit 
committee.  The cost of the company to adhere to the regulation is also low 
because the only potential adverse impact would be that companies that do not 
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currently have many independent directors would have to change their board 
composition to have more independent directors.  While there is still debate 
about whether independent directors add substantial value, very few would argue 
that a company should not have at least enough independent directors to fill the 
audit committee.  There is an outstanding question about whether independent 
directors have sufficient time to perform the audit function, but this will be 
addressed in the criticisms of regulation.  On the other hand, the potential 
benefits of regulation are clearly substantial.  A single scandal avoided is well 
worth these minor costs. 
 Related to the cost is the potential for creating a new burdensome area of 
law that would usurp the law of the states.  However, Sarbanes-Oxley was 
implemented in such a manner as to specifically avoid this possibility.  The 
regulation was implemented by having the SEC require the SRO’s to make 
Sarbanes-Oxley a public listing requirement.  Thereby adherence to Sarbanes-
Oxley is a voluntary issue and not one governed directly by the federal 
government.  Therefore, the law of the states is left untouched and this potential 
problem does not impact the cost of the regulation. 
 Lastly there is a potential concern of the costs of monitoring the Audit 
Committee itself.  That is to say with increased responsibilities, some may argue 
that the Audit Committee needs a monitor.  However, there must be an end to 
checking and historically, we have allowed shareholders to check the board by 
giving them a cause of action against the board for breaching their duties. 
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 Independence is an objective straightforward concept, but the nuances of 
establishing it are more than the market will and does look at.  In order for the 
audit committee to be independent, it must 1) consist of independent directors 
who are not affiliated with the company and do not receive any compensation 
other than director fees and 2) have complete control over the auditor and the 
audit process.  While this appears straightforward and is clearly simple to 
articulate in a regulation, the market does not seem to focus enough on it to 
require it.  For example, how much in affiliated compensation does an audit 
committee member need to receive before it should impact the stock price?  The 
market’s reaction has been and will be to ignore it until there is a failure.  Instead 
of allowing this to happen, the use of the regulation will at least maintain the 
independence of the audit function.  While the independence alone will not 
prevent all scandals, it will at least provide one other perspective of the company. 
Evaluating the New Regulations 
 The value of the regulation appears clear at this point in time, but it needs 
to be monitored to ensure that its benefits exceed its costs.  It is very difficult to 
attempt to isolate the independence function and say precisely how much it has 
benefited the market.  Instead, the best test will be over time the number of 
potential scandals that are found early after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley 
versus the number of potential scandals discovered prior to the passage of 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  That is not to say that any regulation will fix all scandals 
because nothing can stop the person bent on committing fraud, but at least 
forcing the independence will bring a new perspective to the problem. 
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Potential Problems with the Regulation 
The principal concerns with regulating independence focus on structural 
bias, the effectiveness of the independent directors generally, and the potential 
for substantial costs if the process is abused.  While these arguments point out 
potential concerns with boards of directors generally, they do not invalidate the 
value of forcing the audit process to be separate from management 
Structural bias is defined as a presumed bias of directors in the favor of 
management because shareholders usually approve management’s slate of 
directors.  The argument is that this makes the directors beholden to the 
management for their positions and, as a result, will virtually always agree with 
management.  This argument states a problem with boards generally and not the 
audit committee specifically.  Additionally, even if the audit committee members 
were generally beholden to management, it is at least one step removed from the 
management directly controlling the audit process and thereby being able to 
steer auditors clear of issues they know to be problems.  Lastly, there are several 
counter arguments and reasons why independent directors are able to be 
independent: 1) the directors have personal liability for their board actions, 2) 
director’s fees are not usually substantial nor the directors’ only source of 
income, and 3) the directors’ reputation is worth more than the small amount of 
directors’ fees.  Admittedly, the company indemnifies the directors against 
liability, but the director’s reputation is not protected.   
 Professor Elson’s criticism of independent directors goes straight to the 
heart of the second argument that independent directors may not be effective.  
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Professor Elson found that directors spent approximately 3 hours a month in 
preparation for their monthly meetings.  This amount of time might seem to 
indicate that directors will not have sufficient knowledge or understanding to 
control the audit process.  However, this presumes that management will have 
no input into the process.  The audit committee needs to maintain control over 
the process, but management can and should do much of the preparation.  
Furthermore, the auditor will do all the work it previously did, only now it will not 
have the threat of needing to comply with management because that is who 
controlled the relationship.  While this concern raises questions about boards in 
general, it does not call into question regulating the independence of the audit 
committee. 
 Another concern about regulating the independence of audit committees is 
the potential of audit committee becoming essentially a shadow management.  
This concern is based on the idea that if the audit committee is responsible for 
the audit process it may feel that it is responsible for checking every decision 
made by management.  This concern is further enhanced by the fact that under 
Sarbanes-Oxley, the board has an unlimited budget and the ability to seek 
outside advice.  However, the audit committee will likely be held in check by its 
continuing responsibility to the shareholders and the threat of being voted out if 
they become too inefficient.  Furthermore, as stated above, the auditor will still be 
doing the majority of the work making the audit committee function purely an 
oversight function. 
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 An additional concern of the regulation is that forced separation of 
management and the audit committee may decrease communication from 
management to the board, thereby weakening not only the audit function, but the 
effectiveness of the board.  This argument assumes that management’s reaction 
to the separation will be to take an adversarial role against the audit committee.  
This assumption may be correct, but certainly is not a forgone conclusion.  In the 
pre-Sarbanes-Oxley environment, management was sometimes adversarial with 
the auditors, trying to prevent them from discovering issues.28  An adversarial 
situation with the audit committee is likely to arise in the same places where 
there was a previously adversarial relationship with the auditors.  Therefore the 
new regulation only shifts the party to the conflict.  If management is going to 
have a conflict with a group concerning the audit, it should be at the level of the 
board/audit committee to help prevent management from controlling the outcome 
of the issue.  While the communication issue may be a concern, the 
independence will not create a more hostile environment than already may exist. 
 Lastly, as Prof. Ribstien points out, investors need to be more skeptical to 
help insure that companies focus on the shareholders interest.  Any regulation 
has the potential of giving shareholders a false sense of security by leading the 
investor to believe that the government is protecting their interest.  However, in 
this case, the regulation is structural and forces the audit process to be controlled 
by the audit committee.  Structural regulation does not generally create a false 
sense of security because it does not attempt to guarantee something like 
                                                 
28 Andrew Reiss, Powered by more than GAAS: Section 10A of the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act Takes the Accounting Profession for a New Ride, 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 1261, 1273 (1997). 
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qualifications.  Therefore, the independence regulation is unlikely to foster a false 
sense of security by the market. 
The Market is better for determining Member Qualifications 
 In contrast to the over 60 years of the market failing to implement the 
independence of the audit function, the market has been able to discern board 
member qualifications.  Most board members have extensive paper qualifications 
and the courts have consistently held all board members to the same standard 
regardless of background 29.  Markets are better at determining board member 
qualifications because 1) the market and shareholders are already doing a 
successful job at monitoring the quality of board members in general 2) creating 
labels such as ‘financial expert’ merely creates a false sense of security within 
the market, 3) Sarbanes-Oxley creates lax requirements that effectively allow any 
current or former manager of a sizable unit to qualify, 4) qualifications are 
subjective and are not easy to quantify into regulation, and 5) courts already 
create a floor on the ability of board members by holding all board members to at 
least a rudimentary understanding of the business and a duty to monitor the 
corporation.30  The principal arguments against allowing the market to control 
are: 1) regulation creates a slightly higher minimum threshold for the highly 
sensitive position of member of the audit committee, 2) if the title ‘financial expert’ 
causes a false sense of security, simply change it to for example ‘minimum 
qualifications’, and 3) the implementation of these regulations does not usurp 
                                                 
29 Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (NJ 1981) 
30 Id., In Re Caremark 
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state laws.  While these arguments point out some potential value for regulation, 
the minor value is outweighed by the cost of the intrusion into market forces. 
Reasons the Market is Better 
Since the very first corporate boards started, the shareholders have 
always been able to express their will by electing the board of directors.  While it 
is true that more often than not management chooses the directors then 
shareholders endorse them by voting with management, the voting of the 
shareholders is not blind and there are many examples of change of control done 
by proxy (i.e. the shareholders voting against the wishes of management).  
Furthermore, current boards are made up of largely competent and 
knowledgeable board members, demonstrating that shareholders can determine 
who makes a good board member.  This is further reinforced by the increased 
skepticism of the market after the recent series of scandals.  Investors are more 
cautious and more likely to look even more carefully at who is being elected to 
represent their interest.  Lastly, the increasing role of the institutional investor 
helps to ensure that well qualified members will be on the audit committee.  The 
market can and has successfully determined what makes a good director, 
therefore the market should not be disturbed. 
The label ‘financial expert’ conveys to the market that the audit committee 
has at least one person who is more knowledgeable than the vast majority of 
investors.  This concept would make the vast majority of investors feel that they 
did not need to consider who the audit committee members were because the 
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‘financial expert’ is the critical person.  Therefore, creating labels such as 
‘financial expert’ merely creates a false sense of security within the market. 
The ‘financial expert’ qualifications within Sarbanes-Oxley are very loose 
and would encompass just about any current or former manager of a sizable unit.  
Because all that is required is to have worked with accounting to the extent that it 
impacts the financial statements and have used those skills to manage your own 
budget, a manager of a sizable group could be labeled a ‘financial expert’.  While 
the skills of such a person would undoubtedly be valuable to the audit committee, 
they may not be a true ‘financial expert’.  ‘Financial expert’ is defined so loosely 
that it could foster a false sense of security by the market.  This false sense of 
security dramatically increases the total costs of attempting to regulate by 
potentially creating more scandals.  This calls into question any potential gains 
from the regulation. 
The reason that Sarbanes-Oxley’s definition of a ‘financial expert’ is so 
loose is because it is very hard to quantify what makes a person qualified to 
serve on the audit committee.  What makes a good board member generally and 
audit committee member specifically is very subjective and virtually impossible to 
quantify.  Regulation generally works when you can say definitively what is 
needed, but when you cannot quantify what it is trying to achieve, regulation 
merely creates an opportunity for the system to be manipulated.  Critics may 
argue that this only means that the regulations should be tightened.  However, 
because of the subjective nature of qualifications, if the qualifications were to be 
made tight enough that only the most completely qualified people could serve on 
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audit committees, the majority of the good qualified board members would be 
excluded.  Thereby this results in only a handful of people serving on all audit 
committees, driving up the costs substantially.   
The markets are also better because the courts have already created an 
effective floor by requiring all board members to have a rudimentary knowledge 
of the business and a duty to monitor the corporation.  In the Frances case, the 
courts said that an elderly lady who had no knowledge about the business could 
still be found liable for failing her duties as a director because she was an active 
board member.  The court found that all board members are held to at least a 
minimum standard.  Furthermore, the courts have also found that all board 
members have a duty of care that extends to a duty to monitor.  Therefore, all 
board members are already held to at least the minimum standard that a 
reasonable regulation would be attempting to achieve, rendering regulation 
unnecessary. 
The last reason markets are better is because of the increasing role of the 
institutional investor.  Intuitional investors have steadily been increasing their 
influence over the corporations they are invested in.  Some companies are as 
much as 70% owned by institutional investors, such as pension and mutual 
funds.  With so much of the stock concentrated in the hands of one group, that 
group often can demand a place on the board.  It is in the interests of the 
institutional investor to put a highly qualified independent director on the board to 
protect their investment.  It is also in their interest to pressure management to 
allow this person to serve on the audit committee.  While the institutional 
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investor’s influence is likely not be enough to successfully force the corporation 
to have true audit committee independence, it is likely enough to ensure that 
qualified members are on the board.  Therefore the market can do a better job of 
determining what makes a qualified director. 
Potential Problems with the Market 
The primary argument against allowing the market to control focuses on 
the potential value of creating a higher minimum threshold for the highly sensitive 
position of member of the audit committee.  Some may argue that because of the 
increased control that the audit committee has over the audit function, there 
needs to be at least one member of the audit committee who is well versed in the 
audit process.  While there is clearly a potential benefit to having people with 
financial knowledge on the audit committee, the court has enforced a minimum 
level of competency for board members in general and boards already have 
people with financial backgrounds on the audit committee without any regulation 
forcing them.  Furthermore, as mentioned above, to create an artificial minimum 
for at most only one member of the committee by way of regulation merely 
creates a false sense of security and sends a signal to the market not to focus on 
this issue.  Whatever gain can be achieved by this regulation is already achieved 
by the market. 
Critics may argue that if the term ‘financial expert’ causes the false sense 
of security, simply change it to a more neutral term.  However, whatever term you 
call it, it is still a message to the market that the regulation is taking care of the 
member qualifications.  It is true that ‘financial expert’ certainly sends a very 
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strong signal, but whatever the term, it still sends a signal that the market does 
not need to concern itself with member qualifications.  
The last argument in support of the regulation is that the implementation of 
Sarbanes-Oxley does not usurp state laws and therefore should be permissible.  
It is true that if Sarbanes-Oxley had been implemented another way and 
attempted to usurp state laws, the cost of anything within Sarbanes-Oxley would 
be substantially greater because it would create a whole new area of 
jurisprudence that companies would have to try and navigate.  However the mere 
fact that it does not create this added cost does not mean that it does not create 
other even more serious costs. 
Whatever minor potential benefits could be achieved by this regulation are 
substantially outweighed by the false sense of security that the regulation would 
create alone.  Therefore, Section 407 of Sarbanes-Oxley should be repealed and 
the market allowed to control audit committee member qualifications. 
 
Michigan’s View of Board Independence and Qualifications 
 
 States have taken a different approach to board independence.  For 
example, Michigan’s current law regarding independent directors allow the board 
or the shareholders to designate someone as independent as long as they 1) 
have 5 or more years of business, legal or financial experience or the equivalent 
(as an director, senior executive, or attorney), 2) has not engaged in for profit 
transactions in the past three years totaling over $10,000, 3) is not themselves or 
a member of their family currently an executive of the company or any of its 
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affiliates, and 4) has never been an executive with the company for more than 3 
years.31  Michigan seems to put an increased emphasis on maintaining the 
independence by permanently denying a person the right to be ‘independent’ 
once the person has been an executive for 3 years.  In comparison under even 
Sarbanes-Oxley, the person only has to wait 5 years and they can be seen as 
independent.  Furthermore, Michigan seems to have incorporated the ideas of 
either ‘financially literate’ under the BRC or ‘financial expert’ under Sarbanes-
Oxley by simply including a reasonable amount of business, legal, or financial 
experience into the definition of independent.  This seems like the ideal way of 
ensuring that you have a reasonably sophisticated audit committee without 
creating a false sense of security within the market. 
Conclusion 
 
The role of the audit committee has evolved since it was first created in 
response to a 1938 scandal that was eerily similar to the Enron scandal.  In the 
over 60 intervening years between the McKesson & Robins scandal and the 
Enron scandal, we have not been able to establish independence of the audit 
committee by using market forces.  The cost of using independence regulation is 
relatively low and the potential to prevent even one scandal is worth the low cost.  
On the other hand, the market can and does correctly evaluate the qualifications 
of board members in general and audit committee members specifically.  
Furthermore, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to quantify what a qualified 
committee member means.  This makes regulation nearly impossible and very 
                                                 
31 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 450.1107 (2002). 
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costly if it were attempted.  The current ‘Financial Expert’ definition is so loose 
that it simply creates a false sense of security within the market.  If we must have 
a regulation of qualifications, than it should be similar to the Michigan model 
where it is imbedded in the requirements for independent director and is very 
generic.  In conclusion, Sarbanes-Oxley successfully solidifies the independence 
of audit committees but seems to be over reaching concerning committee 
member qualifications. 
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